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Introduction
Official development aid (ODA) is an important source of financial liquidity for developing countries. If funds run dry, these countries face severe economic repercussions. 1 As aid is in part granted on political grounds, both the size and volatility of aid flows are subject to politics. Long-term relations -such as colonial ties (e.g., Alesina and Dollar, 2000) -and short-term shifts in the political importance of recipients -such as membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (e.g., Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland, 2009 ) -affect bilateral ODA flows. Apart from a recipient's international standing, its political positions matter as well. Disagreement between donors and recipients on policies significantly lowers aid flows, especially if issues are highly relevant for donors (Andersen, Hansen, and Markussen, 2006; Dippel, 2015; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014) . Donors even adjust access to liquidity strategically in order to influence elections in recipients countries.
They increase bilateral aid to political friends during election years, thereby bolstering re-election prospects, while they decrease aid to political opponents (Faye and Niehaus, 2012) . 2 Given the fact that donors try to keep their friends in power and actively foster political change in hostile countries, it is surprising that we know only little about the impact of leadership turnover on aid allocation: How do donors adjust aid provision following leader change?
Our paper provides an answer to this question. Leadership turnover -in both recipient as well as donor countries -is a source of uncertainty concerning future behavior in the international arena. Since the pursuit of foreign policy is usually the prerogative of the executive branch, leader change opens the door for large-scale policy change. Although the potential for policy change is high, re-alignment can go in both directions. New leadership does not automatically guarantee improved bilateral relations between donors and recipients. Hence, the consequences of leader change for aid allocation are ambiguous ex ante. Because uncertainty rises, we argue that donors take foreign policy positions announced by recipients under increased scrutiny. Thus, shifts in foreign policy following leader change work as an important source of information on which donors base their decisions regarding aid allocation.
What is more, we argue that the effect of political re-alignment on aid allocation is not only present in case of leadership change in recipient countries, but is also visible following leadership change in donor countries. Given that political relationships between states are reciprocal, changes in the head of executive of donor countries similarly increase uncertainty by discounting past behavior and therefore expecta-1 Not only are aid fluctuations harmful for the economic prosperity of least developed countries (Ebeke and Ölçer, 2013) , but they also escalate the risk of violent civil conflict (Nielsen et al., 2011) . Aid volatility increases the probability of regime survival (Morrison, 2009; Kono and Montinola, 2009 ), yet access to 'easy money' simultaneously tends to weaken the democratic quality of political institutions Smith, 2010, 2013) . 2 Similarly, the United States use their weight in the International Monetary Fund to provide loose conditions on credits (Dreher and Jensen, 2007) and in the World Bank to provide quicker loan disbursement (Kersting and Kilby, 2016) for political friends in the run-up to elections.
tions about future relations. Hence, new donor leaders base aid disbursement on the foreign policy changes of recipient country governments. Our argument thus predicts that sizable reallocation of development aid occurs after either recipient or donor leader change. Yet, the direction should depend on the foreign policy shifts that recipient countries send towards donors. Leaders who signal political accord receive more aid; countries receive less aid if a leader signals political animosity.
To capture foreign policy shifts, we rely on comparable measures of voting alignment in the UNGA (Voeten, 2000) . Voting in international organizations is a very cost-effective way for donors to observe political alignment or dis-alignment of their recipients. Accordingly, UNGA voting patterns have frequently been used to proxy for political closeness between countries (e.g., Thacker, 1999; Barro and Lee, 2005; Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2015) . Indeed, studies suggest that changes in heads of executive make a decisive difference when it comes to foreign policy proximity (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll, 2015) . Yet, research has focused exclusively on either leadership changes in recipient countries only or monadic position changes. We extend this research and argue that leader changes in both recipient and donor countries affect political friendship.
Building on this insight, we scrutinize the effect that a change in voting alignment has on aid commitments. We focus on alignment changes that occur after leadership change in a dyadic donor-recipient leader pair, between leaders from the G7 and developing countries. Covering 133 recipient countries from 1975 to 2012, our analysis shows that yearly alterations of foreign policy alignment have no significant effect on aid commitments, unless occurring after leadership turnover. In line with our argument, the adjustment of foreign policy objectives after leader changes has a huge impact on aid commitments. Donors reward political convergence and punish divergence. Nevertheless, these effects are different in substantial terms.
Our findings suggest that leader changes in donor countries represent a 'window of opportunity' that recipients can use to attract windfall gains in development aid, while recipient leader changes open predominantly a 'window of dis-opportunity' to forgo aid cutbacks. Focusing exclusively on monadic leadership changes in recipient countries is, thus, not able to capture essential variation in the allocation of aid induced by leadership changes. Taken together, recipient country leaders have to decide early on, how to align themselves with their international aid providers.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 presents our theoretical argument linking dyadic leadership change, political alignment, and aid allocation. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy and results. Section 5 presents robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Argument
How does leadership change affect aid allocation? We argue that leadership turnover, both in recipient as well as donor states, opens the door for large-scale policy changes.
Such changes increase uncertainty about future behavior in the international arena.
To mitigate uncertainty, donor countries observe foreign policy shifts following leader change in recipient countries and utilize them as signals before making decisions about aid allocation. Similarly, new donor leaders base their aid allocation on the foreign policy signals recipient countries send ex post. In both cases, they reward alignment and punish dis-alignment resulting in reallocations of development aid.
Leadership Change and the Foreign Policy Agenda
Why does leadership change matter when it comes to foreign policy alignment? Realist accounts of international politics argue that political proximity between countries is primarily determined by the anarchic structure of the international system (Waltz, 1959 (Waltz, , 1979 . According to this perspective, the interests of nation states are presumed to be rather constant over time (Morgenthau, 1948) . Looking at UNGA voting patterns, this notion manifests itself, for example, through the importance of voting blocs (Kim and Russett, 1996) . Countries ally themselves with other countries in their region, with countries that they have formed military alliances with (Leeds and Mattes, 2007) , and with countries that belong to the same international regime -such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (Hansen, 2015) . Their foreign policy positions also tend to be closer to countries that resemble themselves in terms of economic development and type of political system. Accordingly, democracies vote more in line with other democracies on soft-power (Voeten, 2000 (Voeten, , 2004 as well as on hard-power issues, such as self-defense in the context of threats emanating from terrorist groups (Hillman and Potrafke, 2015) . What is more, democracies are easier to bribe, because donor electorates find it more acceptable to provide additional funds to democracies than autocratic leaders (Carter and Stone, 2015) .
While these arguments can explain general alignment tendencies in the long run, they fail to explain short-term shifts in political relationship between countries. Voeten (2000) , for example, finds that voting alliances are much more ad hoc, issuebased and fragile since the end of the Cold War. Hug and Lukács (2014) show that country preferences tend to trump voting blocs in controversial votes in the United Nations Human Rights Council. To explain short-term variation, we stress the role that heads of executive play in pursuing foreign policy goals and argue that leadership changes open up opportunities for structural breaks in foreign policy alignment for two reasons. First, leadership turnover is accompanied by alterations in domestic support groups and, second, it resets personal relationships between leaders. Such instances are thus potential breaking points in bilateral relations.
Assuming that leaders want to stay in power, the pursuit of foreign policy objectives is curtailed internally (Moravcsik, 1997; Putnam, 1988) . Domestic support groups, powerful interest groups, and public opinion influence the re-election prospects of democratic leaders and the power maintenance of autocratic leaders alike. Therefore, changes in foreign policy objectives are due to changes in the domestic support group (Jacobs and Page, 2005; Aldrich et al., 2006) . A democratically elected vote-and office-seeking government faces constraints by its electorate and therefore chooses its foreign policy in accordance with the preferences of this part of the populace (Moravcsik, 1993) . In autocracies the population is generally not eligible to vote or their vote does not make a decisive difference. Nonetheless, leaders in dictatorships are similarly constrained by core support groups -like the regime party, the royal family, or the military (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2010; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014) -and pursue foreign policy goals that are consistent with these interests (Weeks, 2012; Way and Weeks, 2014; Mattes and Rodriguez, 2014) . Hence, interests of influential groups shape leaders' foreign policy agenda in both democracies and autocracies. These agenda are then presented in the international arena.
In line with this, Dreher and Jensen (2013) find that leader changes increase voting alignment of other countries with the United States on key votes. This implies that a country is more likely to agree with the United States on important issues if new leadership reshapes foreign policy. Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll (2015) add that leader changes lead to a shift of ideal points in UNGA voting only if accompanied by simultaneous changes in the domestic support group. They also show that democracies have more stable ideal points than autocracies. To the contrary, leader effects are stronger in autocratic regimes, because the support base is narrower than in democracies and changes in the domestic support groups can be more pronounced (see also Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) . Finally, Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll (2015) highlight that changes in the foreign policy agenda of a country are more abrupt between administrations than within.
Although leaders have to consider domestic constraints in order to hold on to power, they still have considerable leeway when pursuing foreign policy. Politicians might have different visions or weigh the interests of some groups more than of others. Because governments still have some leverage when it comes to satisfying the foreign policy preferences of their core support groups, personal relationships between statesmen similarly affect the chances for cooperation and confrontation in international relations alike (Hermann, 1980 (Hermann, , 1990 
Foreign Policy Shifts and Aid Allocation
International relations can be characterized as a set of bilateral relations between any two countries. Accordingly, the very nature of political alignment is reciprocal.
Given that donor countries care about which recipient leader is in power and have Whether a country under new leadership is a political friend or foe is difficult to evaluate in advance (Fearon, 1995 (Fearon, , 1997 . Relying on ex ante characteristicssuch as the foreign policy stances of leaders in the run-up to elections -may provide an incomplete picture of an administration's foreign policy agenda. Past observed behavior should be heavily discounted as governments have private information that shape their foreign policy preferences, as well as incentives to conceal their true intentions. Additionally, audience costs change in conjunction with leadership turnover, effectively changing incentive structures for the leader after an election. Lastly, the new leader may only imperfectly be bound to path-dependency, or even have come to power by opposing the existing policy platform. Hence, the reaction of the donor hinges on the ex post conduct of the new leadership in the recipient country.
We argue that donor countries observe the behavior of new recipient country leaders during their first year in office, for example via voting alignment in the UNGA. Such votes cover a wide array of issues that allow political actors to estimate alignment tendencies and are thus a "record of how the state wants to be seen by others, the international norms it finds acceptable, and the positions it is willing to take publicly" (Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll, 2015, 283 
H2: Recipient country convergence towards a donor's foreign policy position after donor country leadership change increases aid flows; divergence decreases aid flows.
In summary, leadership changes in both the recipient and the donor country reset personal relationships and the domestic constraints on leaders and open windows of opportunity to fundamentally change foreign policy. In such situations, uncertainty in the bilateral relations between a donor and a recipient country rises and donor leaders make aid allocation decisions depending on ex post changes in foreign policy positions of recipient countries. Because donor countries have vested interests in political alignment, they reward political alignment and punish dis-alignment.
Data and Operationalization
Our dependent variable is official development aid. 4 In line with Faye and Niehaus (2012), we use ODA commitments instead of disbursements, since disbursements in a given year might originate from projects granted earlier. Commitments on the other hand are targeted to a specific country in a given year. Hence, we can directly link them to shifts in political alignment between countries arising from leadership turnover. We take ODA commitments from the Development Action Committee (DAC) database of the OECD (2015). Because aid commitments are highly skewed, we use log-transformed values. We focus mainly on country dyads with positive aid flows to avoid arbitrary log-transformations. Nevertheless, we control for the inclusion of zeros as well as for selection effects in the robustness section. 5
The first independent variable is dyadic leadership change. To measure this, we use data from the updated Archigos dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009 ) to identify the heads of executive of each recipient and donor country. We code a change in leadership if the leader of country i in year t differs from the leader of country i in year t´1. If several leaders were in power in a country during a given year, we focus on the leader that has spent the highest fraction of days in office over the course of the respective year. As such, we assume that more days in office 4 We define ODA as those "flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)" (OECD, 2015) . Over the years the DAC has refined the ODA reporting rules to ensure accuracy and consistency among donors. The boundary of ODA has been carefully delineated, including: 1. Military aid: No military equipment or services are reportable as ODA. Anti-terrorism activities are also excluded. The cost of using donors' armed forces to deliver humanitarian aid is eligible. 2. Peacekeeping: Most peacekeeping expenditures are excluded in line with the exclusion of military costs. Some closely defined developmentally relevant activities within peacekeeping operations are included. 3. Nuclear energy: Reportable as ODA, provided it is for civilian purposes. 4. Cultural programs: Eligible as ODA if they increase cultural capacities, but one-off tours by donor country artists or sportsmen, and activities to promote the donors' image, are excluded. 5 Note that 23% of the bilateral aid flows are zero. This is mainly driven by the complete absence of development cooperation between Japan and several developing countries.
increases the capacity of a country leader to shape foreign policy, within a given year. 6 Assuming that foreign policy is 'high politics' and primarily influenced by the person running the executive branch, we define the head of the executive as the country leader. In a next step, we use information on leadership changes in recipient and donor countries to construct dyadic leader changes. The second independent variable is the change in foreign policy alignment between countries. To proxy the intensity of bilateral relations, we use voting alignment in the United Nations General Assembly. Focusing on the UNGA has several advantages: data availability is generally very high because all sovereign countries have voting rights. Votes in the UNGA furthermore cover a wide array of issues that allow to proxy general alignment tendencies instead of ad hoc political liaisons (Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll, 2015) . Voting alignment has thus often been used to proxy political closeness. We measure voting alignment changes as the difference in the percentage of common yes and no votes between any two countries in one administration dyad vote in line with each other between t´1 and t (Thacker, 1999; Faye and Niehaus, 2012) . The data is provided by Voeten (2013) . Although this difference ranges empirically from -94% to +67%, such radical changes in bilateral relations are rather uncommon. Nevertheless, we test whether our results are sensitive to radical changes by restricting the scope of the alignment change in the robustness section. In addition, we make use of different measures that also include vote abstentions (Barro and Lee, 2005) . Note also that Häge and Hug (2016) show that UNGA affinity scores are sensitive to the inclusion of consensus votes that sys-tematically increase voting alignment between all country pairs. As we use changes in voting alignment, this should however not affect our measure if the number of consensus votes does not change dramatically. In the main models, we use all votes since general foreign policy preferences are arguably more reliably revealed by all votes, as compared to only important votes (Andersen, Hansen, and Markussen, 2006) . Nonetheless, we test the robustness of our results and also include regular votes -votes that reoccur over UNGA sessions -and key votes (Kilby, 2009; Kersting and Kilby, 2016) .
To isolate initial changes in foreign policy alignment from general long-and short-term alignment or dis-alignment tendencies between donor and recipient over time, we further include two variables into our baseline specification: in line with Faye and Niehaus (2012) , we control for alignment between the former recipient and donor leader. For this we use average alignment over the past administration dyad instead of recipient leader dyads. This limits the maximum average alignment to 16 years, whereas Faye and Niehaus (2012) have cases where the alignment is averaged over nearly the entire sample period. For instance, Muammar al-Gaddafi ruled Libya from 1977 to 2011 and essentially covered the whole spectrum of political relationships with several G7 countries over those years. We argue that our dyadic measure of past alignment is better able to capture past alignment because it does not blur the current relations by relations from decades ago that, in addition, were established by other administrations in donor countries. The effect of past mean alignment thus captures how well the previous administration dyad has worked with each other in general and explains path dependency in current bilateral relations.
Moreover, we also include the lagged alignment level since it mechanically determines the possible range of re-alignment. This also controls for short-term alignment effects which could be due to the voting agenda (Häge and Hug, 2016) .
Methods and Findings
In our baseline specification (see equation 1) we regress the natural logarithm of ODA commitments at time t between leader pair d of donor country j to recipient country i on dyadic leader change, alignment changes and their interaction. The alignment change is defined as the difference in common votes between two countries from t´1 and t. The coefficient of interest is the interaction between leader change and changes in voting alignment, i.e. the corresponding change in voting alignment in the UNGA from t´1 (the year of the last leader in either one of the two countries) to t (the first year of the new leader in either one of the two countries). We expect a positive interaction effect of θ implying that alignment following a change in leadership increases aid flows, while dis-alignment decreases aid flows.
φ captures the effect of the lagged alignment. As such, it controls for the contem- In column 4, we further exploit the dyadic structure of our data by employing donor-recipient-pair, donor-year and recipient-year fixed effects. This gravity-like approach (Head and Mayer, 2014) enables us to control for other factors that vary on either donor or recipient countries over time and explain ODA allocation. Hence, unobserved heterogeneity is reduced to variables that vary within the dyads over time and are not explained by variables varying over donor and recipient by year, such as GDP or population size. A further benefit of this approach is that we do not decrease our sample size due to data availability. 8 The results show that the magnitude of the θ even increases when controlling for donor and recipient-specific 8 A downside of this approach is that we cannot draw conclusions regarding the effect of leader change in instances where voting alignment is constant, since the fixed effects absorb this variable. factors. Hence, we are highly confident that our initial results are not driven by omitted variable bias and if they are, they represent a lower bound estimate.
In a next step, we investigate the conditional effect of leadership change and foreign policy realignment on the allocation of ODA commitments by differentiating between foreign policy changes that emanate either after a recipient or donor leader change (see equation 2). 9 The results are displayed in table 2.
Column 1 illustrates that the specific type of leader change matters for aid allocation. While changes in donor countries are statistically insignificant, leadership turnover in recipient countries leads to less ODA on average. Taken at face value, this would imply that donors punish heads of executive that take over power in recipient countries. However, the results in column 3 qualify this effect. The interactions between voting alignment change and both recipient and donor leader change are positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, the sizable interaction effect offsets the negative effect of recipient leader change with zero voting alignment changes. Hence, convergence gets rewarded while divergence leads to a reduction in ODA commitments, regardless whether voting re-alignment is a reaction of recipi- ent countries to a new leader in a donor country or a re-alignment of foreign policy after domestic leader change. 10 Furthermore, the effects hold even in the most conservative estimation approach, in which we include donor-recipient-pair, donor-year and recipient-year fixed effects (column 4). 11 Taken together, these results strongly support hypothesis 1 and 2.
How consequential are these effects for recipient's revenue streams? To answer this question, we estimate the predicted change of ODA commitments in percentage points with respect to the change in voting alignment effect and the type of leadership turnover (based on model 3 in table 2). The results are plotted in figure 1. At the mean alignment change, representing marginal dis-alignment (see table A1), new recipient leaders receive 9.7% less ODA commitments in their first year. In the opposite case of donor leader change, they receive 3.8% higher ODA commitments. 10 To test for autocorrelation, we reran the models in table 3 including lagged ODA commitments (results not reported). The lagged commitments are statistically significant, and have a point estimate of -0.4. A test for first order autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2010; Drukker, 2003) cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation. Furthermore, a Fisher-test for a unit root in panel data using the Dickey-Fuller approach (Choi, 2001) , utilizing up to 3 lags, also neglects the presence of a unit root. We also included donor and recipient change and their respective interactions in separate regressions (results not reported). This leads to an increase in the magnitude and statistical significance of the single effects. Hence, our results are not driven by the inclusion of both types of changes. 11 The results are also robust to different forms of clustering (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011) , such as clustering on donor and recipient or pair and year. more ODA commitments. In substantial terms, these numbers show that signaling political closeness or animosity matters a great deal in times of high uncertainty in bilateral relations, especially with regard to the economic implications of politically granted development aid. Consider for example that the median aid recipient in our sample receives around $100m in development aid from the G7 annually. According to our results, if a new recipient country leader were to alter their foreign policy proximity to international aid providers by one standard deviation, the country would face a cut of 19.6%, i.e. almost $20m.
Note further that the size of the alignment change effect is much more pronounced in case of recipient leader change than for donor leader change (see again figure 1 ). This is due to the fact, that all donor countries react to recipient leader change at once, while only the affected donor reacts after donor leader change. This is also evident from figure 1. The slope of the recipient interaction (black line) is much steeper than the slope of the donor interaction (grey line). Nevertheless, donor changes become more important for recipients the more they depend on the donor's aid commitments. Summing up, political re-alignment after leader change is highly consequential for recipient countries. While new recipient leaders can mainly forgo cutbacks by aligning themselves with donors, existing recipient country leaders have an opportunity to fill the public purse when a new donor leader enters office.
How lasting is the conditional alignment effect? To explore the time structure, we re-estimate our baseline model (equation 2) using several leads and lags (see table   3 ). 12 We expect that past leader changes, interacted with the alignment change, do not affect ODA commitments. In contrast, we expect that the effect of conditional voting alignment change should phase out over time, as countries in the same leader dyad grow increasingly familiar with each other. Ergo, the uncertainty-reducing effect of the first impression should lose its power over time.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 3 show that there is no effect of prospective recipient leader change on ODA provision. Yet, there is an effect of donor leader change on ODA commitments one and two years before the change occurs. The interaction terms are insignificant in all lead specifications. Thus, the conditional alignment effect cannot be explained by developments before any leader change. Column 3 shows the previous results from the contemporaneous effect of our interactions on ODA commitments. Columns 4 and 5 report the results regarding the ODA provision for the first two years after the leader change. Most importantly, the interaction term between recipient change and alignment change is still positive and statistically significant. Given that the size of the effect decreases one year and vanishes two years after the leader change, we conclude that the effectiveness of conditional voting alignment change decreases over time. The interaction effect for donor change is statistically significant at t, yet fades away within one year. The fact that the effect of last year's alignment is only positive and statistically significant in the year after leadership turnover further underpins the importance of first impressions that subsequently predetermine aid allocation trajectories.
Finally, we investigate how different institutional settings and types of leader transitions affect the alignment mechanism. We start by differentiating between legal and illegal leadership change, where we code the latter as irregular entries into office, for example via coups (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009 ). We do so only for recipient countries, as there are no illegal changes in the G7 countries. The results in column 1 of table 4 show a positive and statistically significant alignment change effect in both cases. Furthermore a t-test does not reject that the coefficients are equal. In column 2, we interact our model with a proxy for political struggle, operationalized as years during which a country has more than three heads of executives. In such cases, the alignment change interaction becomes insignificant. This might point to the fact that donors are incapable of gaining enough information dur- ing very short executive tenures in recipient states. Thus, they are unable to figure out who they are dealing with and thus revert to some 'standard' aid allocation.
In column 3, we test whether domestic-support-group change in addition to leader-change amplifies the effects from changes in voting alignment. Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll (2015) highlight that changes in the domestic support groups are the main driver of significant foreign policy re-alignment. We adapt their specification by including their core set of control variables in our dyadic setting (see table A2 in the appendix). We find evidence in favor of our argument regardless of a simultaneous change in the support group of the leader -the interaction term is positive and statistically significant in both cases. At first glance the magnitude of the point estimate is higher in the case of domestic support group change. The t-test, however, indicates no difference between the coefficients. Thus, alterations in the conditions surrounding leader change seem not to change the bigger picture.
We further differentiate between different institutional as well as time specific settings. In column 4, we adapt the Dreher and Jensen (2013) specification and differentiate between the Cold War and post-Cold War period, but use all votes in the UNGA instead of focusing on key votes alone. In column 5, we subdivide the sample into democracies and autocracies in line with Carter and Stone (2015) . 13 The interaction terms between leader change and changes in political proximity show 13 Due to space restrictions, we do not report the coefficients of the additional control variables (see table A2 in the appendix). They are, however, in line with the findings of previous research. expected results, but they reveal interesting variation in terms of effect size and statistical significance. For example, the donor change interaction is only significant in the post-Cold War period and for autocratic recipient countries. The recipient interactions are however not statistically different from one another between time periods. Interestingly, the point estimate of the interaction effect is about twice as large for democratically elected leaders. The presence of the interaction effects for both democratic and autocratic countries increases our confidence that we have not simply picked up lagged election effects (Faye and Niehaus, 2012) , since many of the autocratic countries in our sample do not even hold elections. Again, there is no difference between the interactions of recipient leader change and alignment changes between autocracies and democracies. We attribute this in part to an imprecise estimate in the autocratic setting, driven by relatively few leader changes.
Summarizing our findings, we find overall strong support for our theoretical argument. Political convergence after leader change is associated with higher amounts of development aid. Conversely, political divergence after leader change leads to fewer ODA commitments. These effects are similar for recipient and donor country leader change, but the magnitude of the marginal effect suggests that there is a 'window of opportunity' for windfall gains in ODA in case of a donor leader change, whereas only a chance to forgo aid cutbacks in case of recipient leader change. Finally, we are confident that it is indeed uncertainty about the foreign policy behavior of new leaders on the international stage that drives these effects: first, there is no effect prior to leader change when uncertainty is low. Second, the effect is not conditional on the circumstances surrounding leader change, nor on time periods or the type of political system.
Robustness Tests
In this section we test the robustness of our findings. We check for problems with endogeneity and conclude that our results seem to not be driven by reverse causality.
We also rule out selection effects on the dependent variable and use alternative measures of foreign policy alignment to demonstrate that our results are not subject to specific coding decisions. Finally, we show that the results are not driven by the allocation decisions of single donors.
Reverse causality Studies point to the fact that donors engage in vote buying (Dreher and Sturm, 2012; Carter and Stone, 2015) , intervene in or influence elections in recipient countries (Faye and Niehaus, 2012) , or use other means to oust unfavorable political leaders and regimes in order to achieve commercial objectives. 14 Hence, political convergence (or divergence) between a recipient and donor may depend on commitments (or threats) made by donors prior to leader turnover in a recipient state. The same problem applies to leader turnover in donor countries.
A new US president may alter aid commitments made to recipients directly after inauguration, thus driving recipients to change their alignment strategies.
One solution to address this problem is to employ an instrument that affects leader change as well as political alignment in the UNGA and that is simultaneously independent of any aid commitments. Unfortunately, we are unaware of any instrument that jointly satisfies these criteria. As such, we approach this obstacle by utilizing two different instruments for recipient and donor leader change, respectively. We employ natural deaths of leaders to instrument recipient leader change 14 Berger et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive list of United States' CIA interventions into the domestic politics of developing countries during the Cold War. (Jones and Olken, 2005) . We further use term limits to instrument donor leader change. The latter is however only applicable in the case of the United States. 15
Unfortunately, we cannot instrument changes in foreign policy alignment. Bun and Harrison (2014) and Esarey (2015) , however, indicate that the interaction term between an exogenous and an endogenous variable is itself exogenous as long as there is no contemporaneous reverse causality. Hence, the interaction effects -our main independent variables -are identified as long as we assume that ODA commitments have no effect on the natural death of recipient leaders or term limits in the US.
Column 1 in table 5 shows the results of this instrumental variables regression.
We find a statistically significant interaction effect of donor leader change. The direction of the effect underscores our argument. Signaling political closeness to a new US president whose predecessor was not allowed to run for office anymore increases ODA commitments, and vice versa. Given that only four US presidents
were not allowed to run for re-election during the sample period due to term limits, the results of our robustness check further highlight the validity of our findings.
The interaction between recipient change and changes in voting alignment is not statistically significant, but positive as expected. Although this slightly weakens our findings, it is important to keep in mind that the obtained local average treatment effect relies on very few observations -only 45 recipient leaders died due to natural causes in our sample. In light of this, statistical insignificance is not surprising.
Furthermore, a successor of a leader that died in office due to natural causes usually pursues a policy agenda highly similar to that of his predecessor. 16
Because the IV strategy comprises only a very small sample size, we further test whether ODA affects the foreign policy realignment of countries after leader change. Table 5 provides two specifications where we regress lagged ODA as well as lagged ODA interacted with leader change on the difference between voting alignment in t and t´1. We find a marginally significant unconditional effect of lagged ODA commitments on the contemporaneous change in voting alignment (column 2). In line with previous studies, more ODA increases the recipient's alignment with the donor on average (Dreher and Sturm, 2012) . More importantly, past ODA commitments have no statistically significant effect on alignment changes if we include leader change interactions (column 3). Although we cannot rule out a general alignment-increasing effect of more ODA, the results suggest that reverse causality does not systematically bias the interaction term. This result assures that it is indeed the initial change in political alignment of a new leader that alters ODA commitments.
15 This implies that we cannot include year fixed effects in this specification since the term limit variable would be omitted. To capture global shocks as good as possible, we include a Cold War dummy, a dummy for the War on Terror and a linear time trend. 16 Overall, the Kleinbergen-Paap F-statistic for the under-identification-test is significant at the 5% significant level, the power of the instrument comes however almost exclusively from the termlimits instrument. If we exclude term-limits and instrument only for recipient leader change, the under-identification-test cannot be rejected. after leader turnover. In this specification, none of our variables of interest is statistically significant. Hence, we can conclude that the signaling mechanism after leadership change has no effect on the establishment or abandonment of development cooperation between a G7 donor and our recipients.
Selection on the dependent variable
Although we do not find stark selection effects, columns 3 and 4 of table 6
replicate columns 3 and 4 from table 2 including zero ODA commitments. 17 The main results stay roughly the same. Nevertheless, the substantive as well as statistical significance decreases. Given the results of columns 1 and 2, this is however not surprising. If the interaction of leader change and the political alignment does not have an effect on the extensive margin, including zeros biases the results for the intensive margins downward. Thus, foreign policy realignment is only consequential for recipients that already have established development cooperation.
17 In order to log-transform this variable, we add $1 to each observation. 
Measurement of the independent variable
In a next step we test if our results are driven by the measurement of foreign policy realignment. First, we employ regular votes instead of all votes. This measure is based on recurring votes and therefore not dependent on the yearly fluctuations of the UNGA voting agenda (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2015; Häge and Hug, 2016) . Second, we focus only on key votes -i.e., votes deemed by the US State Department as important -to test if recipients and donors act differently to issues considered as strategically important by the United States. 18 Third, we test if our results are driven by extreme shifts in foreign policy. We run a trimmed least squares regression dropping the bottom and top 5% of the voting change observations. Lastly, we include vote abstentions into the UNGA voting alignment counting abstentions 0.5 (Barro and Lee, 2005) .
The results are displayed in table 7 and again point to the robustness of our previous findings. The interaction between recipient leader change and the change in voting alignment is positive and statistically significant in all but one model. Only in case of key votes (column 2) is the coefficient not statistically significant. At first sight this might seem puzzling. Yet, key votes are based on votes deemed important 18 The data was kindly provided by Kersting and Kilby (2016) .
by the United States and not necessarily by the recipients. Hence, it makes sense that especially new donor leaders reward and punish recipient behavior on strategic issues of their respective country. Furthermore, key votes usually cluster at some specific points in time (e.g., the Iraq War). Recipient country leaders might come to power and, simply by chance, not be able to signal alignment via key votes. Apart from the model in column 4, the interaction between donor leader change and the foreign policy alignment change is positive and statistically significant. Nevertheless, this does not affect the conclusions we draw regarding our theoretical argument. All in all, we find our results not to be driven by strong changes in voting alignment and robust to the different measures of UNGA voting alignment. Alesina and Dollar (2000) have shown that donors differ in the way they disburse aid. The United States is for instance famous for using aid to achieve geo-strategic goals, while France focuses prominently on former colonies. Closely related to this is the question whether changes in the aid commitments of individual donors are due to the changes in the average alignment with the G7 in general or if the results are truly driven by the dyad-specific changes in political proximity. We test the two issues jointly by including the average change in voting alignment with the G7 as an additional control and fully interacting our baseline model for the different donors. Regarding the interaction between recipient change and foreign policy alignment, we find that Canada, Germany, Great Britain and the United States are the main drivers behind the reward and punishment mechanism following recipient leader change. In case of signaling after donor leader change, we find statistically significant results for Canada and Japan, while the rest of the G7 donors (France and Italy) seem to exhibit no such behavior. Interestingly, Italy goes along with the rest of the G7, while France does not react to realignment after leader change, which is consistent with France's focus on former colonies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) . Although we do not find the same effects for every donor, we do not find evidence against our theoretical argument. None of the interaction terms are negative and statistically significant. Rather, the results emphasize that different donors seem to vary with regards to the importance they place on realignment after leadership turnover. Most importantly, the results are not driven by a single donor. In light of this finding donor fractionalization might have an upside for recipients, since they seem not to be dependent on a specific donor.
Differences between donors
Summing up, our results are robust to a variety of specifications. We show that reverse causality, selection effects, and the measurement of political alignment do not conflate our results in a substantive way. Donor countries reward recipients with higher ODA commitments, if they come closer to their own position on in- Significance level: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
ternationally relevant and important policies. To the contrary, recipients signaling political animosity after leader change are confronted with substantial aid cuts.
Conclusion
In this study, we analyze a new mechanism through which big donors induce political aid cycles in recipient countries. We argue that donors place higher scrutiny on recipients' behavior in the UNGA after both donor and recipient leader change. In the aftermath of leadership turnover, otherwise inconsequential yearly fluctuations in voting alignment between recipients and donors lead to substantial effects on aid commitments.
We find that new recipient leaders that converge to a donor during their first year in office receive substantially more aid commitments compared to those that diverge from positions that donors take on in the UNGA. We consistently find this conditional alignment effect in case of both recipient and donor leader change.
The substantial size of the effect, however, is diverse. While new recipient leaders mainly face the prospect of sizable cutbacks in case they dis-align from a donor, stronger alignment towards a new donor leader is seemingly an important strategy to increase ODA commitments. Cutbacks usually range between 9.7% and 19.6%
for dis-aligning new recipient leaders and amount to between 3.8% and 9.1% in increases for recipients that align themselves with a new donor leader. Moreover, aid increases after leader change are only short term as the initial effect fades out in the following two years, and is then overruled by the new alignment levels. Hence, first impressions of a new recipient leader determine the bilateral aid provision that a recipient country will receive from its donors. We conclude that new recipient leaders must warily consider their first appearance on the international stage at the beginning of their incumbency, as donors heavily discount past behavior and predetermine the future trajectory of bilateral relations from first impressions.
Taken together, we provide evidence of an important mechanism explaining the volatility of development aid beyond the effect of elections (Faye and Niehaus, 2012) or political importance due to temporary membership in the UNSC (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006) . Furthermore, politically motivated aid has been shown to be less effective in promoting growth (Dreher, Eichenauer, and Gehring, 2016) and politically committed aid increases aid volatility that induces a heightened risk of civil conflict (Nielsen et al., 2011) . Our results thus highlight that more scrutiny is required to dis-entangle development aid from politically motivated side payments that may have detrimental effects for developing countries. Table A2 : Additional Variables in Table 4 Specification Variables Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll (2015) Democracy (if PolityIV >= 6) Political system transition USA defense pact RUS defense pact Dreher and Jensen (2013) Donor GDP per capita Recipient GDP per capita Political color Carter and Stone (2015) Democracy dummy Donor GDP per capita Recipient GDP per capita Same political color in dyad dummy
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